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Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of 
human behaviour. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behaviour by 
experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (i.e. one-shot two-player Public Goods Game). We examine the distribution 
of cooperation amounts, and how that distribution varies based on the benefit-to-cost 
ratio of cooperation (b/c). Interestingly, we find a trimodal distribution at all b/c 
values investigated. Increasing b/c decreases the fraction of participants engaging in 
zero cooperation and increases the fraction engaging in maximal cooperation, 
suggesting a role for efficiency concerns. However, a substantial fraction of 
participants consistently engage in 50% cooperation regardless of b/c. The presence 
of these persistent 50% cooperators is surprising, and not easily explained by standard 
models of social preferences. We present evidence that this behaviour is a result of 
social preferences guided by simple decision heuristics, rather than the rational 
examination of payoffs assumed by most social preference models. We also find a 
strong correlation between play in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and in a subsequent 
Dictator Game, confirming previous findings suggesting a common prosocial 
motivation underlying altruism and cooperation.  
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Cooperation is central to human societies, from personal relationships to workplace 
collaborations, from environmental conservation to political participation, 
international relations, and price competition in markets1-17. A simple model 
commonly used to study cooperation is the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD), in which two 
agents can either cooperate (C) or defect (D): cooperating means paying a cost c to 
give a benefit b (b>c) to the other person; defecting means doing nothing. The PD is 
an attractive model of cooperation because it highlights the tension between 
individual and collective interests: agents maximize their personal payoff by defecting 
(and avoiding the cost of cooperation). But if both agents defect, both are worse off 
than if they had both cooperated.  
 
Since cooperation is individually costly, standard economic models predict that 
people should not cooperate (unless the game is repeated, in which case theoretical 
models predict18-22, and behavioural experiments demonstrate23-29, that cooperation 
can be favoured via ‘reciprocity’; in repeated games, even selfish players may 
cooperate in order to gain the benefits of reciprocal cooperation in future periods30). 
Yet cooperation in one-time encounters with strangers is common outside the 
laboratory, and a substantial amount of cooperative behaviour is observed in one-shot 
PD experiments in the lab with anonymous players31-41.  
 
Here we attempt to go beyond the observation that people sometimes cooperate in 
one-shot anonymous PDs by shedding new light on the motivations underlying this 
cooperative behaviour. Rather than giving participants a binary choice between C or 
D as is typically done, we make the decision space continuous (i.e. use a continuous-
strategy PD): each participant chooses how much of an endowment to spend on 
helping the other player, with every c units spent resulting in the other person gaining 
b units. We also vary the b/c ratio, and ask how the distribution of cooperation levels 
changes as a result. This allows us to evaluate the predictions of different theories of 
cooperative behaviour and gain insight into the underpinnings of cooperation in the 
one-shot PD.  
 
The standard explanation in economics for non-zero cooperation in one-shot games 
involves social preferences. Social preference theories typically assume that people 
are rational, but that their utility functions include more than just their own material 
payoff. Three main types of social preferences have been proposed: efficiency42, 
whereby people get utility from aggregate welfare (i.e. total payoff of all players) and 
thus may be willing to pay costs to give large benefits to others; inequity aversion43,44, 
whereby people get disutility from unequal payoffs and thus may be willing to pay to 
reduce the difference between their payoff and the payoffs of others; and 
reciprocity45, whereby people get utility from cooperating with those who are 
cooperative and not cooperating with (or punishing) those who are uncooperative, and 
thus may be willing to pay the cost of cooperation if they expect others to do the 
same.  
 
Efficiency models make a clear prediction regarding the distribution and b/c 
dependence of cooperation levels in a continuous-strategy PD: players who primarily 
care about efficiency should engage in zero cooperation if b/c is below the critical 
threshold at which it becomes worth it for them to cooperate, and should engage in 
maximal cooperation if b/c is above this threshold. As threshold values vary across 
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participants, increasing b/c should increase the average level of cooperation by 
shifting more participants from zero cooperation to maximal cooperation.  
 
Theories based on inequity aversion and reciprocity, conversely, do not make clear 
predictions, either about the distribution of cooperation levels or about the response to 
changes in b/c. Both inequity aversion and reciprocity favour matching the 
cooperation level of one’s partner; thus any level of cooperation could be supported 
by these preferences, depending on one’s expectations (i.e. ‘beliefs’) about the 
behaviour of the partner. (This includes zero cooperation: if I believe my partner is 
self-interested, I will not cooperate even though I have a social preference for equality 
or reciprocity.) Therefore, as people can be expected to differ in their expectations 
about the cooperation levels of their partners (given variance in past experience inside 
and outside of the laboratory setting), these models predict a range of different 
cooperation levels, with no reason to expect specific levels to be more common than 
others. Furthermore, inequity averse and reciprocal participants will only change their 
cooperation level in response to changes in b/c in so much as they expect b/c to 
change the behaviour of their partner (for example, if they assume their partner has 
some preference for efficiency). Thus an increase in cooperation with b/c is an 
indication of participants either having efficiency preferences, or expecting others to 
have such preferences. 
 
We also evaluate predictions generated by another class of models which relax the 
rationality assumption of standard social preference models. There is considerable 
evidence that heuristics, rather than rational utility maximization, play an important 
role in decision-making46-50. Heuristics are simple rules of thumb prescribing 
behaviour which is typically desirable, but is not precisely tuned to the details of the 
current decision. Such heuristics may interact with social preferences in various ways. 
For example, inequity averse people might seek equal outcomes based on a fairness 
heuristic which favours equal splits of the endowment, even in cases where an equal 
split does not actually lead to equal payoffs (e.g. if money transferred to the other 
person is multiplied by a constant, b/c>1, transferring half of the endowment causes 
the other person to earn more). In addition, people with inequity averse or reciprocal 
preferences who are trying to predict the behaviour of their partner might be 
influenced by a heuristic that leads them to settle on particularly salient values such as 
the mid-point of the scale (50% cooperation) rather than carefully reasoning about 
what partner behaviour is most likely given the b/c ratio. Both of these interactions 
between heuristic reasoning and social preferences predict relative insensitivity to b/c, 
as well as a distribution of cooperation levels with substantial weight concentrated at 
50%.  
 
In sum, we therefore expect some participants to cooperate either fully or not at all, 
and for increasing b/c to increase the proportion of these participants choosing full 
cooperation; whereas we expect other participants to engage in 50% cooperation and 
to be insensitive to b/c. 
 
To evaluate these various predictions, we had 308 participants play a continuous-
strategy PD in which they were given ten monetary units, and then decided how many 
to transfer to their partner, with any transferred units being multiplied by a constant 
(the b/c value). We varied the b/c ratio across b/c=[2,3,4,5,10], with each participant 
making only a single decision with a single b/c. Finally, we sought to replicate recent 
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results regarding the ‘cooperative phenotype’51, which suggest that a common 
motivation underlies both cooperation in the PD and altruism. Thus, after they 
completed the PD, we had participants play a unilateral, zero-sum money transfer (i.e. 
Dictator Game, DG).  
 
Results 
 
The distribution of cooperation levels for each b/c value is shown in Figure 1. For all 
values of b/c, we see a strongly tri-modal distribution concentrated on ‘give nothing’, 
‘give half’, and ‘give everything’. Aggregating over all b/c values, we find that 22.4% 
participants transferred nothing, 19.2% participants transferred half, 52.3% 
participants transferred all, and only 6.2% participants transferred other amounts.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of cooperation levels in the PD as a function of benefit-to-cost 
ratio. 
 
We next ask how the probabilities of giving nothing, half, and everything change with 
b/c using logistic regression. We find (i) that participants are significantly less likely 
to give nothing as b/c increases (coeff = -.130, p = .019); (ii) that participants are 
significantly more likely to give everything as b/c increases (coeff = .106, p = .010); 
and (iii) that the probability of giving half does not change with b/c (coeff = -.056, p = 
.302). These results are robust to controlling for age, gender, education, and log-
transformed number of previous studies completed (Probability of giving nothing: 
coeff = -.145, p = .013; giving everything: coeff = .131, p = .003; giving half: coeff = 
-.085, p = .142); for completeness we report that when including demographics we 
also find that women (coeff = -0.779, p=0.003) and participants who have had more 
experience with economic games (coeff = -0.330, p = 0.030) are significantly less 
likely to transfer everything. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of diminishing 
returns on increasing b/c: when redoing all of the above regressions including a (b/c)2 
term (to capture non-linear effects of b/c), the non-linear term is never significantly 
different from zero, p>0.3 for all. Thus it appears that increasing b/c shifts people 
from transferring nothing to transferring everything, without affecting the percentage 
who give an even split of half.  
 
5 	  
We now examine how the mean level of cooperation changes as a function of b/c 
(Figure 2). Linear regression finds a significant positive relationship between 
cooperation and b/c (coeff = .239, p = .003; including controls: coeff = .258, p = 
.002); for completeness we report that when including demographics we find similar 
results as above, with women (coeff = -1.12, p = 0.022) and participants have more 
experience with economic games (coeff = -0.592, p = 0.041) being less cooperative 
on average (these findings related to experience are consistent with previous work 
showing that experience with economic games undermines cooperative 
intuitions50,52). We again find no evidence of a non-linear relationship between b/c 
and cooperation (including (b/c)2 term, p = 0.202). We also note that the relationship 
between mean cooperation and b/c is robust to excluding participants who made 
transfers other than nothing or everything (coeff = .283, p = .007). 
 
 
Figure 2. Average amount of cooperation in the PD as a function of benefit-to-cost 
ratio. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
Finally, we analyse the relationship between cooperation in the PD and giving in the 
subsequent DG (Figure 3). Aggregating across conditions, we find a strong positive 
association between the PD and the DG (pairwise correlation: r=.561, p<.001; linear 
regression predicting DG as a function of PD, coeff=.522, p<.001; with controls: 
coeff=.535, p<.001; no significant correlation between any of the controls and DG 
giving). Examining Figure 3 shows that this correlation is largely driven by a lack of 
participants who gave in the DG but did not cooperate in the PD. Put differently, 
cooperators were not necessarily DG givers, but DG givers were almost certainly PD 
cooperators.  
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Figure 3. Joint distribution of cooperation in the PD and giving in the DG. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Here we have shown that cooperation levels in a one-shot continuous-strategy PD are 
tri-modally distributed, with peaks at zero, half and full cooperation; and that 
increasing the b/c ratio reduces zero cooperation and increases full cooperation, but 
that the influence of the b/c ratio is somewhat limited. Further, we have shown that 
giving in the PD is strongly correlated with giving in a subsequent DG.  
 
The trimodal distribution we observe is not readily consistent with predictions of 
standard social preference models in which participants rationally maximize utility 
functions that depend on the payoffs of others. Efficiency concerns clearly predict a 
bimodal pattern of zero or full cooperation, with b/c decreasing zero and increasing 
full cooperation. Seeing as no information was given about the distribution of 
cooperation levels, inequity averse and reciprocal players would presumably have a 
range of different beliefs regarding their partner’s expected behaviour. As a result, 
these models would predict a wide range of different cooperation levels, with no 
reason to expect clear modes at 0%, 50% or 100%. Furthermore, if these players 
believe that other players may have efficiency preferences, then they should 
anticipate partner cooperation increasing with b/c and therefore increase their own 
cooperation levels accordingly. Thus the modes at 0% and 100% cooperation, and the 
increase in cooperation with b/c, suggest that some participants either have efficiency 
preferences or anticipate that others will have efficiency preferences.  
 
The observed trimodal distribution with substantial weight at 50%, and the relatively 
small increase in cooperation in response to a large increase in b/c, conversely, are 
surprising in light of traditional social preference models. Both of these features, 
however, are direct predictions of theories based on heuristic reasoning. A simple 
fairness heuristic could lead participants to transfer 50% to their partners, mistakenly 
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believing that this would lead to equal payoffs. (Note that in the PD, unlike in the 
Dictator Game, 50% cooperation is not the naturally equitable choice: this is both 
because there is multiplier on transfers in the PD, such that if you give 5 out of 10 
units, the other person receives 5*b/c units; and because the other person is also 
making a decision.) Or a heuristic could lead expectations regarding the partner’s 
behaviour to naively anchor on the salient mid-point of 50%. 
 
To gain greater insight into the motivation of participants engaging in 50% 
cooperation, we examined responses these participants gave at the end of the study to 
the prompt “please describe why you made your decision in the game” (such free-
response texts can give useful insights into participants’ decision processes in 
economic games53,54). Consistent with a fairness heuristic, 24% of statements 
explicitly mentioned a desire to be fair as the main motivator for their choice to 
transfer half their endowment to the partner. Consistent with a heuristic focusing 
beliefs regarding partner behaviour on the salient scale midpoint of 50% cooperation, 
15% of statements explicitly said they engaged in 50% cooperation because they 
expected their partner to engage in 50% cooperation, while an additional 22% of 
statements said that they were unsure of whether their partner would cooperate and 
therefore only transferred half of the endowment. (Interestingly, another 16% of 
statements explained the choice to transfer half of the endowment by saying that it 
was a compromise between generosity and self-interest, a motivation that to our 
knowledge has not been previously discussed and which merits further study; the 
remaining 24% of statements either gave no reason or were not readily categorizable). 
In sum, participants’ post-experimental descriptions of their decision processes 
provide direct evidence of heuristic use motivating the choice to engage in 50% 
cooperation. We note that many of the participants engaging in zero or full 
cooperation may have also been using heuristics, but for these choices it is difficult to 
disentangle heuristic reasoning from rational application of social preferences, as they 
lead to the same outcomes. For example, a heuristic that prescribes contributing 
everything is indistinguishable in this paradigm from a rationally applied efficiency 
preference. (This is unlike a fairness heuristic that prescribes giving half of the 
endowment, because giving half does not in general actually create equal outcomes in 
our PDs.) Finally, it is important to note that the present study illuminates the role 
heuristics play in the implementation of social preferences, rather than the role that 
heuristics formed via internalization of norms may play in the origin of social 
preferences50,55,56. 
 
An important limitation of our experiment is that because of our between-subjects 
design, we cannot observe specific individuals changing their behaviour. Thus we 
cannot distinguish between two possibilities among our participants giving nothing or 
everything: it could be that each such person has a personal minimum b/c at which the 
psychological benefits of cooperation begin to outweigh the financial costs. If this 
was the case, any given person would always give nothing below that critical b/c, and 
always give everything above it; and the gradual increase in average cooperation with 
b/c we observe in Figure 2 would be the result of more and more people having 
passed their personal thresholds. Alternatively, it could be that people behave 
probabilistically, with their chance of cooperating in any given decision increasing as 
b/c increases. In this case, the graded response to b/c that we observe at the population 
level in Figure 2 would also be reproduced within each individual. Distinguishing 
between these possibilities is likely to be difficult, however, because of consistency 
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and contagion effects, like those we observed between the PD and the DG: if one’s 
choice in a given cooperation decision is heavily influenced by choices in 
immediately previous decisions, it makes it difficult for experimenters to obtain a 
clean measure of how the payoff structure influences that person’s choices. 
Nonetheless, this is an important direction for future research. 
 
To our knowledge, only a handful of previous studies have experimentally 
investigated how the payoff structure affects cooperation in a one-shot PD. All of 
these studies have used a binary PD, preventing them from drawing conclusions 
regarding the distribution of cooperation levels, which is our main focus. With respect 
to the effect of the PD’s payoff structure on cooperation, these studies have typically 
not used the benefit-to-cost ratio decomposition of PD payoffs, but instead directly 
varied one or more of the payoffs associated with the four possible PD outcomes 
([C,C],[C,D],[D,C],[D,D]). An early study found that cooperation increased as the 
[D,D] payoff was decreased57, a finding that was replicated across a wider range of 
values in a more recent study34. Two other studies found that cooperation decreased 
as the ratio of payoffs ([D,C]-[D,C])/([C,C]-[D,D]) was increased58,59. We add to 
these studies by examining the distribution of cooperation amounts, and by using the 
b/c formulation which is standard in evolutionary game theory60 and readily 
interpretable in terms of predictions based on efficiency preferences. 
 
The substantial correlation we observe between play in the PD and the DG adds 
weight to previous work from our group showing significant correlations in play 
across the DG, the Public Goods Game (a 4-person version of our continuous PD), 
and the Trust Game, which was argued to reflect a ‘cooperative phenotype’51. This 
replication is important, given that an earlier study found no correlation between the 
Public Goods Game and a modified Dictator Game in which participants made 21 
decisions between two pairs of options that were more or less fair61. Both our study 
and ref 51 had an order of magnitude more participants than ref 61; thus, it is possible 
that the latter null result was due to a lack of power. It could also be that the modified 
DG structure of ref 61, in which many extremely similar decisions were made in a 
row, introduced self-consistency effects or other confounds that obscured a true 
relationship with the Public Goods Game.  
 
Further evidence regarding the relationship between cooperation and fairness comes 
from the fact that DG givers in our study were almost entirely a strict subset of PD 
cooperators. This observation suggests that the motives present in the DG (e.g. 
inequity aversion) are also present in the PD, but that additional motives exist in the 
PD that do not in the DG (e.g. concerns about efficiency or the choice of the other 
player).  
 
In sum, our results give insight into the decision-making process in one-shot 
anonymous Prisoner’s Dilemma games. We provide evidence that many people who 
cooperate deviate from traditional models of rational self-interest not only by being 
sensitive to the payoffs of others (i.e. being ‘other-regarding’), but also by using 
simple heuristics. We also provide further evidence for a domain general proclivity to 
cooperate across games.  
 
Methods 
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We recruited participants using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk)32,62-64. Participants received a $0.35 show-up fee and were told they would 
be playing a two-stage game in which they could earn additional income.  
 
In the first stage, participants were paired with another MTurk worker, and both were 
given $0.10. They each then chose how much, if any, to transfer to the other person, 
with any transfers being multiplied by a constant k. We manipulated the PD payoff 
structure by varying the value of k across k=[2,3,4,5,10], with a given participant 
being randomly assigned to a single value of k (i.e. a between-subjects design). In this 
continuous PD, b/c=k because for each cent participants transferred, the recipient 
received k cents. 
 
Before making their decision, participants answered comprehension questions to 
make sure they understood the payoff structure (see Appendix for the exact 
instructions). Given that our key manipulation involved changing the payoff structure, 
it was essential that participants understood the payoffs. Therefore, participants who 
answered any questions incorrectly were not allowed to participate. After answering 
the comprehension questions, participants made their PD decision, and then moved on 
to the second stage (without learning their partner’s decision in the PD, to prevent 
contagion effects).  
 
In the second stage, participants were paired with a different MTurk worker. 
Participants were given $0.10 and had to decide how much, if any, to unilaterally 
transfer to the other person (transfers were not multiplied, and the other person had no 
initial endowment and made no transfer decision – i.e. participants played a standard 
Dictator Game). Finally, participants completed a free-response describing the 
reasons for their decisions in the games and a demographic survey. After all 
participants had been recruited, they were matched at random and payoffs were 
calculated as described. No deception was used in this study, informed consent was 
obtained from all participants, and the study was approved by the Harvard University 
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects. Methods were carried out in accordance 
with the approved guidelines. 
 
A total of 308 US resident participants answered all comprehension questions 
correctly (mean age=30.8 years, 62% male) and were thus allowed to participate in 
the experiment (140 people answered one or more comprehension questions 
incorrectly and were excluded). IP addresses were screened to prevent the same 
person from participating repeatedly. 66 participants were assigned to the PD with 
multiplier k=2; 56 participants were assigned to the PD with multiplier k=3; 60 
participants were assigned to the PD with multiplier k=4; 61 participants were 
assigned to the PD with multiplier k=5; and 65 participants were assigned to the PD 
with multiplier k=10. In addition to the $0.35 show up fee for completing the task, 
participants earned an average of $0.47 of additional income based on the games. 
 
To assess the free-response statements participants giving half in the PD provided 
regarding their motivations in the game, two research assistants coded each response 
from these participants. The coders were not informed about the purpose of the study 
or the various hypothesis and predictions being tested.  For each statement, they were 
asked which of the following eight categories best described it (fraction of statements 
assigned to each category indicated in parentheses): 
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1. The participant explicitly said that they took the action because it was fair 
(24%)  
2. The response indicates that the participant expected the other person to take 
the same action, so that’s why they took it (15%) 
3. The response indicates that because the participant felt uncertainty about the 
other person’s action, the participant decided to hedge / reduce variance by 
taking this action (22%) 
4. The response indicates that the participant wanted to compromise between 
taking a selfish action and taking a generous action (16%) 
5. The participant explicitly references intuition / their gut feeling / going with 
the first thing that came to them (3%) 
6. The response indicates that the group payoff would be maximized by taking 
this action / it would be overall best for everyone to take this action (2%) 
7. The response restates what the person did, but does not provide an explanation 
(13%) 
8. The response indicates that the participant didn't want to be greedy / selfish 
(6%) 
 
Finally, we show the instructions of the k=10 condition here:  
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